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Financial Frictions and the Futures Pricing Puzzle 
 
Abstract: 
In perfect capital markets, the futures price of an asset should be an unbiased forecast of its 
realized spot price when the contract matures.  In reality, futures prices are often higher for 
some assets and lower for others.  However, there is no stability in the relationship between 
futures prices and the realized spot prices.  This instability has been a puzzle in the existing 
financial literature.  The key to this puzzle may lie in the nature of the model and the lack of 
market imperfections.  In this study, we take a theoretical approach in a dynamic multi-period 
environment.  We incorporate competition between disparate economic agents and impose 
financial frictions (i.e., imperfections) that are in the form of hedging and borrowing limits on 
them.  Our model gives rise to multiple equilibria, each with unique market clearing prices, 
with the market switching between these equilibria.  Our analysis incorporates a 
comprehensive consideration of the risks faced by the futures markets participants (i.e., 
speculators and hedgers) and leads to a better understanding of the puzzle. 
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1.  Introduction 
The futures pricing puzzle is one of the oldest asset pricing puzzles in finance and has 
been an object of study for over a hundred years (Rouwenhorst and Tang, 2012).  In its most 
basic form, it signifies the discrepancy between the empirical behavior of commodity prices 
and theoretical assertions, which suggest that the futures price of an asset should be an 
unbiased forecast of its realized spot price when the contract matures.  Our paper suggests that 
this puzzle arises due to the presence of multiple equilibria in the futures market, and the 
frequent shifting of market outcomes between these equilibria. This interpretation has 
important implications in that it implies that price risk is not always efficiently re-allocated by 
futures markets. 
Futures markets provide opportunities for producers and end-users of commodities 
(henceforth, commonly termed hedgers) to mitigate the risk associated with holding or buying 
these assets by hedging against future changes in the spot price.  Speculating counterparties to 
these transactions are willing to bear this risk and are compensated via an ‘insurance’ 
premium (Stoll, 1979; and Jebabli and Roubaud, 2018).  Anderson and Danthine (1983) 
propose two views on the relationship between the spot and futures price.  The first assumes 
that the futures prices are unbiased predictors of the future spot rate at contract expiration.  
The other view, consistent with Keynes (1930), suggests that the two prices are not 
equivalent.  The difference in prices implies that hedgers pay an insurance premium to 
speculators, the size of which is a function of their relative levels of risk aversion and the net 
positions of the hedgers.  This price deviation is termed as Normal Backwardation when the 
futures price lies below the expected spot price (Anderson and Danthine, 1983).  In contrast, 
the deviation is termed as Contango when the futures price trades above expected spot.1  In 
either case, the flow of profits between hedgers and speculators is akin to the premiums from 
an insured to the insurer (Lee, 2013). 
Despite Keynes’s confidence on the ‘normality’ of backwardation, the majority of the 
research displays mixed results on the reliability of this phenomenon. Numerous studies have 
arrived at inconsistent results despite examining the same commodities over similar time 
periods and employing extremely sophisticated statistical techniques (Houthakker, 1957; 
Rockwell, 1967; Chang, 1985; Rouwenhorst and Tang, 2012; Mishra and Smyth, 2016). 
                                                 
1 In his seminal paper, Keynes (1930) did not strictly differentiate between discount and premium, and referred 
to them both as Normal Backwardation.  However, contemporary literature differentiates between the two 
outcomes. 
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This discrepancy between the theory and empirics might arise as a result of the strong 
assumptions of perfect capital markets, without assuming any risk-shifting behavior on the 
part of economic agents entering into a futures contract.  The novelty of our study consists of 
introducing frictions into the theoretical model of futures markets, in the form of borrowing 
and hedging constraints to enforce compliance or fulfilment of the futures contract.2  These 
constraints differ for hedgers and speculators.  Furthermore, they also differ between short 
hedgers (such as producers) and long hedgers (such as consumers).3  Ignoring these 
constraints on futures markets participants can lead to erroneous futures pricing conditions, 
because financial constraints restricting risk-shifting confer market power to one or more 
agent type in the economy. 
The main purpose of this paper is to illustrate the impact of these frictions on the pricing 
of futures.  That is, to reconcile the conflicting results of futures prices in the empirical 
literature to the presence of multiple varying equilibria where the pricing parameters of 
futures (and hence its discount or premium to expected spot) are not uniquely determined.  In 
this way, our paper provides a theoretical explanation for the futures pricing puzzle which has 
been well documented in the literature. 
We model commodity futures in a simple overlapping generations model with Rational 
Expectations (RE).4, 5  Competition between economic agents determines the supply and 
                                                 
2 David Adler (2014, pp. xi) expounds that: “A friction is an impediment, obstruction, or constraint that 
prevents markets and economies from working smoothly.  This approach to economics is a departure from the 
frictionless, idealized world of classical economic and financial theory, such as the Arrow-Debreu model of 
general equilibrium or the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and 
others…..(F)rictions….are a central issue in today’s revision of economics, one that economists had 
previously overlooked or had trouble formally modelling.” 
 
3 The strict assumption of perfect capital markets without mitigation of risk-shifting implies that the gyrations 
stemming from the financial sector of the economy will be allowed to permeate the real sector, where the 
transaction costs of offsetting (or changing) operations are prohibitive.  Management Science literature 
classifies this as a reverse of the well-known Bull-Whip or the Whiplash Effect (Wang and Disney, 2016).  
This effect focuses on the economic inefficiencies caused by the amplification of information on the demand 
of an end-product up the supply chain, constituting of retailers and suppliers, leading to an increase in the 
variance of demand and hence cost of inventory.  In the context of our study, storage operators of a 
commodity (and ultimately the consumers) are extremely vulnerable to cost overruns as they are downstream 
of the supply chain.  This is the reason why we classify all producers and consumers as strictly hedgers. 
 
4 Overlapping generations modelling is adopted for its rigor and strong following in the academic and policy 
communities (Weil, 2008).  This framework also allows participants to stack up on open interests on futures 
(subject to their binding constraints).  Within this setting, employing RE allows asset prices to aggregate and 
reveal private information in equilibrium (Biais et al., 2010).  This is a consequence of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis where capital market participants can easily decipher any private information held by a 
counterparty by observing their trading patterns (EMH – Bray, 1981; Jawadi et al. 2017; and Jebabli and 
Roubaud, 2018).  This assumption is valid for the commodities sector as governmental and non-governmental 
organizations disseminate information to economic agents about future commodity price/ demand (Tang et 
al., 2015). 
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demand side relationships and consequently the equilibrium parameters of futures contract.  
Nonetheless, our model is distinct from the widely used models in the literature assuming 
perfect capital markets (Breeden, 1980; Jagannathan, 1985; and Kolb, 1996; Hirshleifer, 
1988; De Roon et al., 2000; Arseneau and Leduc, 2013; Gorton et al., 2013; Hamilton and 
Wu, 2015).  These models, based as they are on homogenous agents, do not reflect the real 
world where open positions in the futures market are concentrated in the hands of an elite 
group of financial market agents. In contrast, the approach taken in this paper is consistent 
with this empirical observation. 
We initially study the case of a perishable commodity in an economy with three types of 
agents.  There are two types of hedgers, commodity producers and consumers, along with a 
single type of speculators.  We model competition between these economic agents in the 
presence of borrowing and hedging constraints which reflect the reality of futures markets.  
The commodity producers (as hedgers) are confined to shorting an amount of futures they are 
able to produce in the worst state of the economy.  Likewise, the consumers (as hedgers) are 
constrained to taking positions that they can fulfill in the worst state of the economy.  Finally, 
the speculators are constrained by internal risk management, which prevents them from taking 
excessive positions in the futures market.  Thus the basic model yields results which shed 
light on the futures pricing puzzle. 
After solving the basic model, with a perishable commodity, we extend our study to 
include a non-perishable good, which gives rise to the possibility of storage.  We also extend 
our analysis to model the effects of institutional investors in futures markets, as a means of 
modelling the ‘financialization of commodities’ (Basak and Pavlova, 2016; and Aїt-Youcef, 
forthcoming).  We ignore the imposition of position limits as they are deemed to be 
counterproductive (ap Gwilym and Ebrahim, 2013). 
Our model extends the framework of ap Gwilym and Ebrahim (2013), where random 
shocks of production (or yield risks) emanating from the supply side impact on the 
equilibrium pricing of the commodity, leading to price risks on the demand side.  This has 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 Recent studies such as Sockin and Xiong (2015) and Singleton (2017) have emphasized on informational 
frictions in the commodity markets.  Practitioners, however, refute this perspective as stated in Meyer and 
Hume (2016, p. 20): “The advent of ship tracking software, satellite data on crop conditions and other 
services has also eroded the value of traders’ inside knowledge of commodity flows.  “Technology in the last 
20 years has made information asymmetry a much less common thing,” said Richard Payne of Accenture 
Consulting, who is a former Cargill executive.”  Nonetheless, informational advantages added to our analysis 
will exacerbate the market power of one set of economic agents vis-à-vis others.  This does not change the 
quality of our results. 
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credence in the real world as agricultural commodities are subject to the fluctuations of 
weather on the supply side, giving rise to changes in prices which affect the demand side. 
We make the following assumptions in our analysis:  First, the agents in our economy 
are heterogeneous across types, but homogenous within their type.  In other words, producers 
in our study are strictly short hedgers, while consumers are strictly long hedgers.  
Furthermore, speculators  take a position opposite to that of the aggregate hedging one 
(incorporating the netting of producers’ and consumers’ positions).  Second, the short horizon 
of our study constrains the various classes of agents to enter into binding futures contracts, 
which cannot be offset as in a multi-period framework.  Third, our study prices futures 
contracts in a nonlinear setting instead of a linear, ‘cash and carry’, one where arbitrage is not 
feasible (Varian, 1987).  This yields futures prices as a function of risk aversion parameters of 
agents in the economy.  Our study can be interpreted as one in a complete markets setting, 
entailing ‘iron-clad’ or ‘firm commitment’ contracting in the sense of Popescu and Seshadri 
(2013), by imposing constraints on agents to curtail risk-shifting, and thus defaults. 
Our dynamic model, yielding a multitude of equilibria, sheds light on the futures pricing 
puzzle.  The economic ramifications of our results are important, as the multiple equilibria 
characterize the extent to which the price risk of the commodity is being dissipated in the 
financial system.  This issue is of interest to academics, practitioners, policy-makers as well as 
regulators as commodity price risk can instigate financial crises.  The most efficient 
equilibrium involves the optimal allocation of the commodity price risk across the different 
agents.  The further we go down the pecking order of equilibria, i.e., from the most efficient to 
the least efficient ones, the lower is the reduction in price risk.  In other words, the decreasing 
order of Pareto-efficiency signifies an increase in the price risk.  The traditional futures 
market view is that the role of hedgers is to disperse the underlying commodity price risk, 
while that of the speculators is to shoulder some risk in order to improve the return of their 
overall portfolio.  Our multiple equilibria arise from the trade of financial claims between 
different hedgers and/ or speculator.  This gives rise to erratic behavior in the differences 
between futures and expected spot.  That is, it represents a change in the cost of insurance (in 
the form of a premium or discount) as the market moves from one equilibrium to another.  
This can even result in the migration of a premium to a discount or vice versa, thus 
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rationalizing the futures pricing puzzle.  This also implies that creating a perfect hedge with 
commodity futures is not guaranteed in our framework.6 
Testing our theoretical results empirically is beyond the scope of this paper as the 
moment conditions, characterizing each equilibrium used for estimating the model based on 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), are changing.  The number of moment 
conditions is dynamically unstable and varies depending on whether the budget, input and 
hedging constraints are satisfied or not.  Consequently, employing different moment 
conditions lead to different estimation results. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature, while Section 3 
models futures contract of a perishable commodity and illustrates its solution.  This result is 
extended to the case of storable commodity in Section 4.  Finally, Section 5 concludes the 
study. 
 
2.  Related Literature 
Recent work by Rouwenhorst and Tang (2012) (R&T) revisits the empirical literature to 
check the theory of normal backwardation.  Their study examines: (i) commodities positions; 
(ii) risk premia; (iii) profit and speculation; and (iv) storage decisions.  R&T found that with 
respect to net positions of commercials (aka hedgers), the directional hedges were consistent 
with normal backwardation.  However, the tests of several empirical papers indicated that 
there is limited evidence of normal backwardation in explaining risk premia and that the 
explanations are more consistent with storage decisions.  With respect to risk premia, R&T 
found results coherent with previous literature indicating that, at the individual commodity 
level, the evidence for normal backwardation was not statistically significant.  However, at the 
aggregated portfolio level, the average basis for a majority of commodities is negative.  This 
result implies that futures curves are upward sloping (contango) in most markets.  
Additionally, the work conducted by Chang (1985) is reexamined on a more recent dataset to 
identify the ability of non-commercials (aka speculators) to earn profits.  Profitability of 
speculator’s trades, a necessary condition for normal backwardation, yields inconsistent 
results.  Analyses conducted across 28 commodities markets at the weekly and monthly 
                                                 
6 The quality of our results do not change when a set of institutional agents are allowed to invest in commodity 
markets in conjunction with financial ones.  Our tweaked final model is able to: (i) help integrate the 
commodity and financial markets; and (ii) improve risk-sharing that is contingent on the risk-bearing capacity 
of financial investors.  These two additional features lead to a commodity risk-premium, a subresult which is 
in agreement with that of Acharya et al. (2013), and Basak and Pavlova (2016).  This subresult, however, 
does not influence our main result, which is the intricacy of pricing of futures under multiple equilibria. 
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levels, reveal that the market timing ability of speculators is not statistically significant in any 
of the 28 markets.  At the individual asset level, timing is significant in 7 out of 28 markets, 
although the results are unstable.  That is, markets with timing ability at the weekly level are 
not the markets with timing ability at the monthly level and vice versa.  The authors found 
that these results conflict with Chang’s findings, which suggest normal backwardation. 
Given the lack of consistent results regarding normal backwardation, the theory of 
storage has also been used to understand risk premia in futures markets.  This is largely 
attributable to the interaction that exists between the production side of the market (supply) 
and the consumption side (demand).  Work has been done by a number of authors (Kaldor, 
1939; Working, 1949), which rationalize contango as emanating from the difference between 
storage costs (costs of holding inventories) and the convenience yield (a real option that 
fluctuates in value and that is inversely related to the inventory level).  Further research links 
these risk premia to inventory levels (Fama and French, 1987; Acharya et al., 2013; and 
Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst, 2013).  The findings within these strands of research 
reveal fairly consistent patterns, which illustrate risk premia as declining with inventory 
levels.  Ultimately, risk premium volatility is a function of the level of inventories.  R&T 
suggest that the ambiguity of the findings may be a function of the temporal nature of the 
research conducted and the results may be sample and/or time specific. 
Given the above inconsistencies, many researchers have opted for partial and general 
equilibrium models of commodities pricing and storage (Arseneau and Leduc, 2013; ap 
Gwilym and Ebrahim, 2013; Sockin and Xiong, 2015).  Constrained optimization allows 
researchers to control the environment of the model in line with theory.  This is however not 
consistent with the noisiness of actual data in the real world.  For example, Arseneau and 
Leduc (2013) integrate a canonical rational expectations model into a general equilibrium 
framework.  They find that the movement of interest rates in a general equilibrium context 
enhances the effects of competitive storage on commodity prices.  Relative to fixed interest 
rate models, a non-stationary interest rate leads to higher persistence in commodity prices (and 
simultaneously lower volatility) with competitive storage.  Many of the policy prescriptions 
offered by regulators been built upon conjecture that has been found to be erroneous 
empirically.  Arseneau and Leduc (2013) provide evidence which refutes the assertion that 
institutional trading drives commodity prices away from fundamentals.  They find that 
endogenous movements in interest rates, implied under general equilibrium, reinforce the 
impact of storage on commodity prices.  This leads to persistence in commodity prices due to 
  
8 
 
 
 
consumption smoothening.  They develop the framework of the seminal work of Williams and 
Wright (1991) who use a partial equilibrium model in which the interaction of consumers, 
producers and storers endogenously determines prices.  Their model incorporates a two period 
economy with households (making a static optimal labor supply decision and an optimal 
intertemporal savings decision) and a production sector (final goods sector and primary 
commodity sector).  The commodity sector incorporates producers and risk neutral speculators 
who exist to smooth price volatility in the primary commodity sector.  This volatility is 
smoothed via the competitive storage market for the commodity.  Equilibrium in the model is 
achieved by way of three household optimizing conditions (labor supply, savings and primary 
commodity demand), two firm optimizing decisions (labor demand and industrial demand for 
the primary commodity), the profit maximizing condition for the commodity producer and the 
optimal, non-negative storage condition.  A key outcome of this line of research is the ability 
of the household to consume smoothly over time given the level of storage, which is a 
function of interest rates and subsequently intertemporal savings decisions, in equilibrium.  
Not only do the results provide salient outcomes on commodity volatility and consumption, 
but also provide theoretically valid insights that can influence policy as it relates to 
commodity market intervention/control. 
Additionally, Acharya et al. (2013) suggest that the impact of speculation on commodity 
prices is not zero as determined in many studies.  They rationalize that increase in speculation 
has stabilizing impacts in the futures market.  This emanates from the enabling of producers to 
more effectively manage inventories with short positions.  The authors contend that demand 
for commodities is largely driven by actual physical demand, despite the price instability 
caused by speculators in the past.  In this paper, the authors use an equilibrium model of 
commodity markets, where speculators are capital constrained and producers have hedging 
demand for commodities futures.  This model incorporates both channels of the traditional 
theory of futures prices, hedging demand and inventory management.  In addition to a 
simulated approach, there is also an empirically motivated component of the paper, i.e. 
producer’s default risk.  The model is a two period model of commodity spot and future 
prices, which incorporates both optimal inventory demand (a la Deaton and Laroque, 1992) 
and hedging pressure demand (akin to Anderson and Danthine, 1980; and Hirschleifer, 1988).  
The structure of the model is similar to research mentioned previously (including Arseneau 
and Leduc, 2012; and ap Gwilym and Ebrahim, 2013).  There are three agents in the model: 
(i) consumers who demand the commodity; (ii) producers who manage profits via inventory 
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management and futures hedging; and (iii) speculators whose demand for spot and commodity 
futures jointly determine the futures price with producers hedging demand.   They find that: (i) 
commodity producers’ default risk is positively related to their hedging demand; (ii) an 
increase in the default risk of producers is predictive of an increase in the excess returns on 
short-term futures; (iii) the effect of default risk of producers on risk premia is greater in 
periods of higher volatility; (iv) the proportion of risk premium attributable to default risk is 
greater when the demand for assets from institutional investors is diminishing; and (v) as 
producers’ default risk increases, they will hold less inventory, thereby depressing current spot 
prices.   
The increase in the financialization of futures markets has been well documented in the 
literature (Gosh et al., 2012; Tang and Xiong, 2012; Algieri, 2016; Basak and Pavlova, 2016; 
and Aїt-Youcef, forthcoming).  Simultaneously, there has been a significant increase in the 
volatility in futures markets as well (Cheng et al., 2015; Roy and Roy, 2017; and Mo et al. 
2018).7  As a result of the highly volatile commodities pricing environment over the past eight 
years, many practitioners and regulators have proposed that restrictions be placed on 
commodities futures in the form of position limits (U.S. Senate Subcommittee Report, 2009).  
One of the most notable examples is the hedge fund manager Michael Masters.  In his 
testimony before the U.S. Congress, Masters claimed that speculation in the commodities 
markets has led to the increase in price volatility, reducing liquidity and impeding upon the 
price discovery process.  Masters suggested that the increase in prices was brought about by a 
significant increase in the demand side, creating a ‘bubble’ in the commodities markets.  
Empirically, however, there is very little evidence supporting his claim as markets are 
sufficiently liquid to absorb the large order flows (Hamilton and Wu, 2015).  Thus, index 
funds' investment in commodities futures markets does not harm the price discovery 
mechanism.  Regulatory support for position limits in futures markets ‘appears to be ill 
conceived’ (ap Gwilym and Ebrahim, 2013). 
 
3.  The Theoretical Model  
We assume a simple overlapping generations economy with two goods, a commodity 
and a numeraire good, and three types of agent, Producers (P), Consumers (C) and 
Speculators (S). The commodity is produced solely by the Producers and consumed solely by 
                                                 
7 Cheng et al. (2015) illustrate that volatility in the futures markets, stemming from crisis, leads to financial 
traders [hedgers] to reduce their long [short] positions respectively. 
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 the Consumers.
8 Speculators neither produce nor consume the commodity, but may choose to 
hold futures contracts relating to it as counter-parties to either Producers or Consumers. 
Agents of generation ‘t’ are born in period t, endowed with an amount eit+1
 of the 
numeraire (where i ∈ {P,C,S} represents agent type). During this period, Producers decide 
how much of their endowment to devote to producing the commodity, and all agent types 
decide whether or not to engage in futures contracting. In the following period, t+1, agents of 
this generation are mature, the stochastic output of the productive process is realized and 
futures contracts are settled. The agents also trade and consume the goods. 
The production process used for the commodity is subject to random shocks (
~
t+1
) 
stemming from exogenous forces such as weather or any idiosyncrasy of the production 
process.  The distribution of 
~
t+1
 is presumed to be bounded, and is known to all agents.  Each 
producer converts x
t+1
 units of the numeraire good into y
~
t+1
 units of the commodity using the 
production function y
~
t+1
 = g(x
t+1
, 
~
t+1
).  We assume that the production function is 
monotonically increasing in both arguments, and concave in the input x. 
All agents are risk averse, maximizing the expectation of their respective strictly 
concave and twice continuously differentiable (Von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility functions. 
 
3.1.  Financial Frictions: 
The producers and consumers are hedgers in our framework. We assume that financial 
frictions imply that the positions that these agents hold in futures markets are constrained by 
their ability to settle their positions under the worst state of the economy. Hence, producers 
abstain from contracting futures beyond what they produce in the worst state of the economy: 
q
Pt+1
  ≤  Min.[ g(x
t+1
, 
~
t+1
) ] (1) 
where q
Pt+1 
is the position held by the representative producer in the futures market. Similarly, 
consumers are constrained to holding a position that they will be able to settle: 
 qCt+1
 ≤  Min.[ 
C
~
t+1
] (2) 
where q
Ct+1 
is the position held by the representative consumer in the futures market, and their 
demand for the commodity is represented by 
C
~
t+1
 =c
~
(p
~
t+1
, eCt+1
), and p
~
t+1
 is the stochastic 
price of the commodity in the spot market. 
                                                 
8 Initially, we assume that the commodity is perishable. This assumption is not critical to our analysis, and is 
relaxed in Section 4 to demonstrate the invariance of our basic results. 
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We refer to equations (1) and (2) as hedging constraints. They are crucial in controlling 
risk-shifting in our simple economy. Both academics and practitioners (Rolfo, 1980; Lee, 
2003) corroborate this assumption.  These constraints are central to the internal risk 
management of firms participating in futures markets.  A recent report by the counterparty 
Risk Management Policy Group III (2008), known as the Corrigan Report, ascribes weakness 
in such compliance systems for instigating ‘rogue’ trading. 
We assume that the speculators’ participation in the futures markets is limited by a 
resource (or capital) constraint on the speculator akin to that espoused in Acharya et al. 
(2013). The Corrigan Report (Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group III, 2008) 
recommends such a constraint. We term this the internal risk management constraint and 
model it as a symmetric constraint limiting the capital exposure of speculators: 
     |q
St+1
| ≤  q¯
t+1
 (3) 
We further assume that financial frictions prevent producers from borrowing funds that 
they may be unable to repay. Hence, the following input constraint restrains the resources 
employed in the production process to the endowment of the producer: 
      x
t+1
  ≤  ePt+1
 (4) 
 
3.2.  The Commodity Producer: 
The goal of each of the n
Pt
 Producers of generation ‘t’ is to optimally select the amount 
(x
t+1
) of endowment to be employed in the production process and the amount (q
Pt+1
) of the 
commodity to be pre-sold in the futures market (at a unit price f) in order to maximize their 
expected utility of consumption.  That is, 
 Max.  E
t
{U
P
(c
P
~
t+1
)} 
 (in c
Pt+1
, x
t+1
, q
Pt+1
) 
subject to the hedging constraint (equation 1), input constraint (equation 4) and the following 
budget constraint: 
 c
P
~
t+1
+ x
t+1
  ≤  ePt+1
 + q
Pt+1
f
t+1
 + p
~
t+1
 [y
~
t+1
 – q
Pt+1
] (5) 
where c
P
~
t+1
 is the stochastic consumption of the numeraire good by the producer when they are 
mature. 
This optimization gives rise to the following first-order conditions:9 
                                                 
9 In this and the following sections, we follow the standard step by step microeconomic procedure for 
optimization, details of which are not given for brevity. 
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 E
t
[U'
P
(c
P
~
t+1
)p
~
t+1
g(x
t+1
,
~
t+1
)] = E
t
[U'
P
(c
P
~
t+1
)]+E
t
(Φ
t+1
)–E
t
[µ
t+1
[Min.(g(x
t+1
,
~
t+1
))] (6) 
f
t+1
 – E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t 
(U
P
'(c
P
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
 E
t 
(U
P
'(c
P
~
t+1
))
 + 
E
t 
(µ
 t+1
)
 E
t 
(U
P
'(c
P
~
t+1
))
 (7) 
where Φ
t+1
 and µ
t+1
 are the Lagrangian multipliers on the input and hedging constraints 
respectively. 
Equation (6) implies that, in the absence of binding input or hedging constraints (i.e., 
Φ
t+1
 = µ
t+1
= 0), the marginal utility of consuming out of earned income equals the marginal 
utility of consuming from endowment. If the input constraint is binding (i.e., Φ
t+1
> 0) then the 
optimal level of production is at the corner (i.e. x
t+1
 = ePt+1
) and the marginal utility of 
consuming out of earned income exceeds the marginal utility of consuming from endowment.  
However, if the hedging constraint is binding (i.e., µ
t+1
 > 0), the marginal utility of consuming 
out of earned income is below that of the marginal utility of consuming from the endowment. 
This is because extra production relaxes the constraint. 
Equation (7) represents the supply side relationship of q
Pt+1
 units of output pre-sold (at a 
price f
t+1
).  In other words, it links the futures price with that of the expected future spot 
prices.  The covariance term (i.e., Cov
t
(U'
P
(c
P
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
) is negative, as an increase in the 
expected price of the commodity increases the wealth of the producer thereby leading to a 
decline in the marginal utility of the producer.  This implies that, in the absence of a binding 
constraint (i.e., µ
t+1 = 0), illustrated below, the producer will optimally pre-sell qPt+1
 units of 
the commodity at a discount to the expected spot price.  This discount represents the cost of 
avoiding the risk of selling at the future spot price.  Here, the producers do not have any 
power to extract economic surplus from the futures market. 
f
t+1
 – E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t 
(U
P
'(c
P
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
 E
t 
(U
P
'(c
P
~
t+1
))
  <  0 (7b) 
 
If, however, the hedging constraint is binding (i.e., µ
t+1
> 0), as illustrated below, then 
the discount, and hence the cost of ‘insurance’, is reduced.  Here producers have the power to 
extract economic surplus. 
f
t+1
 – E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  >  
Cov
t 
(U
P
'(c
P
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
 E
t 
(U
P
'(c
P
~
t+1
))
  <  0 (7c) 
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3.3.  The Consumer: 
The goal of each of the nCt
 Consumers of generation ‘t’ is to optimally select the amount 
(qCt+1
) of the commodity to pre-purchase in the futures market along with the amount           
[
C
~
t+1
 – qCt+1
] in the spot market in order to maximize their expected utility of consumption.  
Here, 
C
~
t+1 
represents the consumer’s demand for the commodity.  That is, 
 Max.  E
t
{U
C
(c
C
~
t+1
, 
C
~
t+1
)} 
 (in c
C
~
t+1
, 
C
~
t+1
, qCt+1
) 
subject to the hedging constraint (equation 2) and the following budget constraint: 
 c
C
~
t+1
 + qCt+1
 (f
t+1
) +p
~
t+1
 [
C
~
t+1
– q
Ct+1
]  ≤  eCt+1
 (8) 
where c
C
~
t+1
 and 
C
~
t+1
 are the consumption by the representative consumer of the numeraire 
good and the commodity respectively, while the remaining notations have the same meaning 
as stated earlier. 
This optimization gives rise to the following first-order conditions: 
E
t
[U'
C

(c
C
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
)]  =  E
t
[p
~
t+1 U'C
C(c
C
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
)]  –  E
t
[Φ'
t+1 
∂[Min.c
~
t+1
]
∂
Ct+1
]  (9) 
 f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)    
Cov
t
(U'
C
C(c
C
~
t+1
, c
~
 t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'
C
C(c
C
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
  
E
t
(Φ'
t+1
)
E
t
(U'
C
C(c
C
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
 (10) 
where Φ'
t+1 is the Lagrangian multiplier on the consumer’s hedging constraint. 
Equation (9) illustrates the relationship between the expected marginal utilities of the 
numeraire good and the commodity.  When the hedging constraint is not binding (i.e., Φ'
t+1= 
0), then the expected marginal rate of substitution between the two goods is equal to the 
expected price ratio.  On the contrary, when the constraint is binding (i.e., Φ't+1> 0), then 
consumption of the commodity decreases, reflecting its lower expected marginal utility. 
 
Equation (10) represents the demand side relationship of qCt+1
 units of the commodity 
pre-bought at a price f
t+1
.  In other words, it links the futures price with that of the expected 
spot price.  The covariance term (i.e., Cov
t
(U'
C
C(c
C
~
t+1
, 
C
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
) is negative [positive] in our 
two good economy when the substitution effect dominates [is dominated by] the income 
effect.  That is, an increase in the expected price of the commodity decreases the relative 
planned consumption of it thereby increasing [decreasing] the planned consumption of the 
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numeraire.  This results in the following relationship between futures and expected spot 
prices.  When the hedging component is not binding, (i.e., Φ'
t+1
 = 0), demonstrated below, the 
consumer will optimally pre-purchase q
Ct+1
units of the commodity
 
(in the futures market) at a 
discount [premium] to the expected spot price.  This discount compensates for the riskiness of 
the expected spot price.  Here, the consumers have no power to extract economic surplus. 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)    
Cov
t
(U'
C
C(c
C
~
t+1
, c
~
 t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'
C
C(c
C
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
  <  0 when the substitution effect dominates
 (10bi) 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)    
Cov
t
(U'
C
C(c
C
~
t+1
, c
~
 t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'
C
C(c
C
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
  >  0 when the income effect dominates
 (10bii) 
 
In contrast, when the hedging constraint is binding (i.e., Φ'
t+1
 > 0), as demonstrated 
below, then the above discount [premium] is higher [lower].  Here, the consumers enjoy the 
power to extract economic surplus. 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)    
Cov
t
(U'
C
C(c
C
~
t+1
, c
~
 t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'
C
C(c
C
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
 (10c) 
 
3.4.  The Speculator: 
The goal of each of the nSt
 Speculators of generation ‘t’ is to optimally select the amount 
(q
St+1
) of the commodity to pre-purchase in the futures market in order to maximize their 
expected utility of consumption.  That is, 
 Max.  E
t
{U
S
(c
S
~
t+1
)} 
 (in c
St+1
, q
St+1
) 
subject to the internal risk management constraint (equation 3) and the following budget 
constraint: 
 c
S
~
t+1
+ q
St+1
f
t+1
  ≤  eSt+1
 + q
St+1
 (p
~
t+1
) (11) 
where c
S
~
t+1
 is the consumption of Speculator at (t+1), while the remaining notations have the 
same meaning as stated earlier.  It should be noted that the sign of q
St+1
may be positive 
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[negative] representing a long [short] position in the futures contract.  In other words, 
speculators arbitrage between futures and spot prices. 
 
  This optimization gives rise to the following first-order condition: 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t
(U
S
'(c
S
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U
S
'(c
S
~
t+1
))
  –  
E
t
(Φ''
t+1
)
E
t
(U
S
'(c
S
~
t+1
))
 (12) 
where Φ''
t+1 is the Lagrangian multiplier on the speculator’s internal risk management 
constraint. 
  Equation (12) represents the demand [supply] side relationship for positive [negative] 
units of output (q
St+1
) pre-purchased [pre-sold] at a price f
t+1
.  It also constitutes an arbitrage 
pricing condition for the Speculator.  Here, the covariance term (that is, Cov
t 
(U'
S
(c
S
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
) 
is negative [positive] as an increase [decrease] in the expected price of the commodity implies 
an increase in the wealth of the Speculator, and thus, a decrease in the expected marginal 
utility of consumption.  Thus, equation (12) can be interpreted as follows: The Speculator will 
optimally pre-purchase [or pre-sell] q
St+1
 [˗qSt+1] units of the commodity at a discount 
[premium] to expected spot price in the absence of the risk management constraints (Φ''t+1) as 
explained below.  This discount compensates her/ him for bearing the risk of the spot price.  
Here speculators have no power to extract economic surplus. 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t
(U
S
'(c
S
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U
S
'(c
S
~
t+1
))
  <  0   q
St+1  >  0 (12bi)
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t
(U
S
'(c
S
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U
S
'(c
S
~
t+1
))
  >  0   q
St+1  <  0 (12bii)
 
 
  If the long risk management constraint (i.e. Φ''
t+1 > 0) is binding, the discount is 
widened.  In contrast, if the short risk management constraint (i.e. Φ''
t+1 < 0) is binding the 
premium is widened.  Here, speculators enjoy the power to extract economic surplus. 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  <  
Cov
t
(U
S
'(c
S
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U
S
'(c
S
~
t+1
))
   (12c) 
 
3.5.  Market Clearing and Solution of the Model: 
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A Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) is defined as the one in which all agents in 
the economy are aware of: (i) the probability distribution of the random shock (
~
t+1
) of the 
production process; along with the (ii) structure and parameters of the economic model. 
A REE satisfies: 
a) the first order conditions represented by equations 6, 7, 9, 10 and 12, 
b) the production function, 
c) all three budget constraints (i.e., equations 5, 8, and 11) with equality as they bind, and 
d) the clearing of the market for the commodity (equation 13 below) along with that of 
futures market (equation 14), and the market for the numeraire good (equation 15). 
nCt
 [c
~
t+1
] = nPt
 [g*(x
t+1
*, 
~
t+1
)] = nPt
 [y*
~
t+1
] (13) 
nPt
 q
Pt+1
 = nCt
 qCt+1
 + nSt
 q
St+1
 (14) 
nPt
 c
P
~
t+1
 + nCt 
c
C
~
t+1 
+ nSt
 c
S
~
t+1
  =  nPt
 e
Pt+1
+ nCt
 eCt+1
 + nSt
 eSt+1
 (15) 
 
 
[Insert Table about Here] 
 
The model yields numerous solutions for generation ‘t’ contingent on the market power 
of one or more agent to extract economic surplus.  This is dependent on: (i) whether the input 
or the hedging constraints are binding; and (ii) whether one of the economic agents fails to 
participate in the futures market.  A total of 56 solutions (including 16 double ones) are 
observed.  The initial 28 (including 8 double ones) constitute as interior solutions (i.e., x
t+1
 < 
ePt+1
 ), while the remaining 28 (including 8 double ones) comprise as its replicative corner 
solutions (i.e., x
t+1
 = ePt+1
).  The initial 28 (including the 8 highlighted double solutions in 
blue) are illustrated in Table 1.  This result is an advancement relative to ap Gwilym and 
Ebrahim (2013) as we illustrate solutions (such as 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14 and 15) where one 
or more agents are priced out of the futures market.  This is because the first order condition 
on the amount of commodity pre-purchased (or pre-sold) in the futures market (i.e., 
∂L
t
∂q
t+1
) is 
not satisfied.  This development relative to the previous study comes in spite of us employing 
a symmetric risk management constraint on the Speculator.  The basic 28 solutions range from 
the highest ranking (or most efficient) equilibrium (PCS)
t+1
 to the mid-ranking equilibria 
(including PC
t+1
, PS
t+1
, CS
t+1
, P'C'
t+1
, P'S'
t+1
, C'S'
t+1
) to the lower ranking ones (such as P
t+1
, 
C
t+1
, S
t+1
, (P')1-2(t+1)
, (C')1-2(t+1)
, (S')1-2(t+1)
).  It should be noted that an equilibrium such as 
PC
(t+1)
 denotes one where the pricing of futures is determined jointly by Producers and 
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Consumers, while Speculators are price-takers, extracting economic surplus.  Finally, (P')
1(t+1)
 
and (P')
2(t+1)
 represent equilibria where the pricing of futures is determined solely by the 
Producer with another agent as a price-taker and the last one being priced out of the futures 
market.  The basic solutions include some that do not make economic sense.  That is, (i) 
solutions such as 6, 11, 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 27 and 28, where the binding hedging or risk 
management constraints conflict with the Kuhn-Tucker Conditions; or (ii) solutions such as 
20, 23 and 26, where the economic agent, who is supposed to set the price of the futures 
contract does not participate in the market.  When these inconsistent results are removed, we 
are left with 16 interior solutions and 16 corner ones.  We elaborate on these feasible solutions 
in the Appendix. 
Under the dynamics of the model, the solution for the next generation depends on the 
heterogeneous growth of the competing agents impacting on the market clearing condition of 
the numeraire good through their aggregate endowments (equations 13 and 15).  If the 
endowments of the agents for period (t+2) change, it impacts on their budget constraints and 
their market clearing conditions (equations 4, 5, 8, 11, 13 and 15).  If the technology of 
production changes or productivity improves, this impacts on the production function 
[g
t+2
(x
t+2
, 
~
t+2
)] and subsequently the hedging constraints and the aggregate demand/ supply of 
the commodity in the subsequent period (equations 1, 2 and 11).  Finally, changes in the 
probability distribution of the random shock (
~
t+2
) along with the structure and parameters of 
our model (described above) impacts on the Kuhn-tucker conditions of all agents leading to a 
change in equilibria.  This implies that as generations advance from ‘t’ to ‘(t+1)’ to ‘(t+2)’ 
etc., we will observe movements between equilibria, rationalizing the Futures Pricing Puzzle. 
 
3.6. Key Result of Model 
Proposition 1: 
Hedging a perishable commodity’s price risks in a perfect and complete market with 
financial frictions (encompassing heterogeneous producers, consumers, and speculators in a 
simple one period overlapping generations economy) is feasible in multiple Rational 
Expectations Equilibria ranked in a pecking order of decreasing efficiency. The equilibria 
range from an unconstrained interior one, where none of the agents have any economic power; 
to corner ones, where one or more agents have market power.  Normal backwardation or 
contango are feasible for the same commodity contingent on the equilibria at hand.  Extending 
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our results of Generation ‘t’ to that of Generation ‘(t+1)’ yield volatile movements between 
multiple equilibria. 
This result helps to explain the futures pricing puzzle as follows.  The multiple 
equilibria exemplify the extent to which the commodity price risk is diffused in the financial 
system.  The most efficient equilibrium entails maximum dispersion of the price risk.  In 
contrast, the lower tier equilibria contain some residual price risk.  Thus, the further we go 
down the pecking order of equilibria, the less is the price risk diffusion.  The movement 
between equilibria involves different hedgers and speculators, giving rise to changes in the 
cost of insuring the price risk (in the form of a premium or discount).  It is this varying cost of 
insuring the price risk that rationalizes the futures pricing puzzle. 
 
Proof of Proposition: See the Appendix for the elaboration of our results. 
 
Thus, our model yields multiple equilibria, ranked in a decreasing order of economic 
efficiency, with the market fluctuating between normal backwardation and contango.  This 
result, illustrating as it does the varying costs of insuring the underlying commodity price risk, 
explains the futures pricing puzzle.  The result emanates from our non-linear (i.e., risk-averse) 
constrained framework and is different from the unconstrained perfect capital markets models 
in the literature such as the: (i) risk-neutral (i.e. linear) ‘cash-and-carry’ one, where arbitrage 
yields a unique equilibrium; and the (ii) partial equilibrium framework where the futures 
pricing mechanism is unique for each commodity and is contingent on its systematic risk and 
cross-market hedging pressures (Breeden, 1980; Jagannathan, 1985; Hirshleifer, 1988; Kolb, 
1996; De Roon et al. 2000; Hull, 2006; Arseneau and Leduc, 2013; Gorton et al., 2013; 
Hamilton and Wu, 2015).  The key difference is that our equilibrium involves consumption 
smoothing, and the market power of participants emanating from the borrowing and hedging 
constraints that are absent in the above frameworks. 
Testing for multiple equilibria using real data is extremely challenging for empirical 
researchers and can lead to conflicting results for the same commodity studied.  One possible 
way to run the test is as follows.  Since each equilibrium implies distinct moment conditions, 
one can think about building tests based on the GMM approach, in particular using the 
Sargan’s J test of over-identification/ identification (Sargan, 1958, 1975; and Hansen, 1982).  
However, this is supplemented with strong assumptions requiring inflexible (budget, input or 
hedging) constraints on economic agents, which may not be realistic.  Changes in the 
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constraints lead to the market fluctuating between equilibria, and consequently between their 
respective moment conditions, resulting in inconsistent inferences.10   
The appendix of our paper summarizes the solutions of our dynamic model under 
different frictions (i.e., borrowing and hedging constraints).  The solutions are characterized in 
terms of moment conditions that take the form of equalities and inequalities.  The appendix 
also shows that the solutions of our dynamic model are described by a number of these 
equality/inequality moment conditions depending on the constraints of economic agents that 
change over time.  This instability in the constraints of economic agents implies different 
equilibria given by different equality/inequality moment conditions.  This instability in the 
moment conditions (movements between multiple equilibria) make the 
estimation/identification of the model and consequently of the futures pricing extremely 
challenging.  In addition, the estimation results will depend on the moment conditions that we 
use.  Using different moment conditions might lead to different estimation results.  Gregoir 
(2002) argues that the estimation of models with non-unique equilibrium using a GMM-type 
approach is a demanding task.  Furthermore, in contrast to the standard GMM approach, 
where all moment conditions take the form of equalities, Moon and Schorfheide (2009) argue 
that estimating models in which a subset of moment conditions take the form of inequalities 
[see for example our Solution 9] may introduce identification problems.  That is, there is a 
non-singleton subset of the model parameter space that satisfies the equality/inequality 
moment conditions under consideration. 
As mentioned earlier, the constraints of economic agents change over time.  This makes 
the use of low frequency data for the estimation of our dynamic (futures pricing) model very 
complicated.  This is because in low frequency data the constraints are likely to change at each 
data point, which makes the estimation extremely challenging.  In contrast, there is less 
likelihood in high-frequency data (e.g., every millisecond, second, or minute) that these 
constraints will change with a large number of data points.  It might therefore be reasonable to 
assume that the constraints are stable within a day.  With high frequency data, the number of 
observations within a day are very large.  This makes for stable moments and ensures that the 
models are correctly identified/ estimated.  However, if within a day the constraints of 
                                                 
10 One way to surmount this difficulty is to use high frequency (tick-by-tick) data and make the assumption that 
the constraints are stable over a small interval of time, such as a day.  High or ultra-high frequency data could 
provide enough observations, within a day, to estimate the parameters of interest using GMM, while the 
constraints leading to the moment conditions are stable.  High frequency trading (HFT) is now garnering the 
attention of contemporary researchers (Brogaard et al., 2014). 
 
  
20 
 
 
 
economic agents lead to a subset of moment conditions that take the form of inequalities, then 
as Moon and Schorfheide (2009) point out this might introduce identification problems for 
our model.  
Thus, from the above, we can infer that frictions lead to futures markets oscillating 
between multiple equilibria, thereby rationalizing the futures pricing puzzle. 
 
4.  Extension of Model to Storable Commodities and Institutional Investors 
In the previous section, we analyzed the pricing of futures contract based on the Theory 
of Normal Backwardation (Keynes, 1930).  This was done in an overlapping generations 
setting assuming the perishability of the commodity.  This section extends the same issue but 
from the framework of the Theory of Storage (Kaldor, 1939; Working, 1949 and Brennan, 
1958).  For the sake of brevity, we do not present the full model here.  This is available from 
the corresponding author on request. 
We relax our assumption of perishability by allowing the stockpiling of commodities in 
a multi-period overlapping generations economy (Chaturvedi and Martinez-de-Albéniz, 
2016). Each time ‘t’ generation consists of an identical number of agents (nPt
 Producers (P), 
nCt
 Consumers (C), nSt
 Speculators (S) and nIt
 Inventory Operators (denoted by suffix I)), who 
are born in period t, young in period (t+1), mature/old in period (t + 2), and dead in period (t + 
3) and beyond.  Our earlier assumption of fixed endowments for all agents is retained in the 
submodel of storable commodities in Section 4.1 below.  We tweak this submodel in Section 
4.2 below to incorporate the financialization of commodity markets (Basak and Pavlova, 
2016; and Aїt-Youcef, forthcoming) by changing the Inventory Operators to that of 
Institutional Investors (denoted by suffix II) and bestowing them with stochastic endowments 
(representing their stake in financial markets) in periods (t+1) and (t+2). 
Since accumulation of commodities impact on the distribution of their spot prices 
(Chambers and Bailey, 1996), the theory stipulates that spot prices, and thus their underlying 
futures prices, are impacted by the management of inventory. 
Our extended model encapsulates Storage Operators (in Section 4.1) and Institutional 
Investors (in Section 4.2), who are subject to capital/ resource constraint which limits their 
hedging ability.  Since capital is the essential ingredient needed to expand capacity, a capital 
constraint is akin to a capacity constraint.  In this extended model, the aggregate demand for 
the commodity stems from consumers in conjunction with storage operators/ institutional 
investors.  In equilibrium, this should equal the aggregate supply stemming from Producers in 
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conjunction with inventory saved by storage operators or institutional investors (net of 
wastage).  Thus, the equilibrium conditions incorporating the capital constraint (on storage 
operator or institutional investors) include a function linking consumer demand (with 
stochastic yield) with inventory (incorporating replenishment and depletion). 
The model yields an optimal inventory policy for the storage operator or institutional 
investors.  This is evaluated in an open interval where the expected value of marginal utility 
on consumption multiplied by the stochastic price of inventory (net of wastage  adjusted for 
cost of carry) is zero.  The lower bound of the open interval, which has a value of zero, is 
termed as the Gustafson (1958) condition signifying the impossibility of carrying forward 
negative inventories.  The upper bound of the open interval is the optimal operational yield of 
the producer (y*
~
t+1
). 
 
4.1.  Key Result of the Model with Storable Commodities 
Our model solution illustrates that hedging a commodity’s price risk in a complete market 
with frictions (comprising of heterogeneous producers, consumers, speculators and storage 
operators ‒ in an overlapping generations economy) again involves movement between 
Rational Expectations Equilibria, ranked in a pecking order of decreasing efficiency, with the 
market alternating between normal backwardation and contango (or vice versa).  The solution 
in this case comprises at most 2(165) = 330 equilibria of which 2(104) = 208 are not 
economically viable.  The initial interior solution thus comprises of 61 equilibria, which are 
described in the decreasing order of economic efficiency as follows: PCSI
t+1
, PCS
t+1
, PCI
t+1
, 
PSI
t+1
, CSI
t+1
, P'C'S'
t+1
, P'C'I'
t+1
, P'S'I'
t+1
, C'S'I'
t+1
, PC
t+1
, PS
t+1
, PI
t+1
, CS
t+1
, CI
t+1
, SI
t+1
, (P'C')1-
2(t+1)
, (P'S')1-2(t+1)
, (P'I')1-2(t+1)
, (C'S')1-2(t+1)
, (C'I')1-2(t+1)
, (S'I')1-2(t+1)
, P''C''
t+1
, P''S''
t+1
, P''I''
t+1
, 
C''S''
t+1
, C''I''
t+1
, S''I''
t+1
, P
t+1
, C
t+1
, S
t+1
, I
t+1
, (P')1-3(t+1)
, (C')1-3(t+1)
, (S')1-3(t+1)
, (I')1-3(t+1)
, (P'')1-3(t+1)
, 
(C'')1-3(t+1)
, (S'')1-3(t+1)
, (I'')1-3(t+1)
.11 
 
4.2.  Key Result of the Model with Institutional Investors 
Here the futures pricing model incorporates covariance terms involving the marginal 
utility of consumption of Institutional Investors with the stochastic spot prices of commodities 
(akin to an extended equation (12)).  The smoothing of future consumption, which depends 
                                                 
11 Here the (P'')
1(t+1)
 (P'')2(t+1) 
and (P'')3(t+1) represent three separate equilibria where the pricing of futures is 
determined solely by the Producer with another agent as a price-taker and the remaining two agents being 
priced out of the futures market. 
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upon payoffs from both financial and commodity markets, increases the correlation between 
the two markets.  This result integrates the two markets, leading to portfolio diversification, 
depending on the capacity of financial investors as discussed in Acharya et al. (2013) and 
Cheng et al. (2015).12  This leads to time varying commodity risk-premia as discussed in Bask 
and Pavlova (2016).  However, this subsidiary result does not affect our main result, that 
futures markets are characterized by movements between multiple equilibria. 
 
A dynamic economic environment again implies movement between equilibria, with the 
market alternating between normal backwardation and contango.  This is difficult to analyze, 
generating irreconcilable results.  This strengthens our earlier result rationalizing the futures 
pricing puzzle. 
 
5.  Concluding Comments 
Futures contracting is employed to alleviate commodity production and price risks.  The 
pricing of futures, however, has confounded academics, practitioners, policymakers and 
regulators for decades.  This issue has led to researchers querying whether normal 
backwardation or contango is really the norm for commodities.  This paper, however, takes a 
completely different approach to this crucial issue of asset pricing.  We model the rivalry 
between agents in an overlapping generations (i.e., dynamic) economy with frictions in the 
form of borrowing and hedging constraints.  These frictions alternately endow market power 
to the various market participants, leading to movements between equilibria.  These equilibria 
can be ranked in a decreasing order of Pareto-efficiency, reflecting a diminution in the 
efficiency sharing the commodity price risk.13  We attribute the inconsistent results in the 
empirical literature to the movement of the market between multiple equilibria, giving rise 
alternately to both normal backwardation and contango as it accrues from the exchange of 
financial claims between different hedgers and/ or speculator.  This yields varying costs of 
insuring the commodity price risk (in the form of premium or discount).14 
                                                 
12 This result, implying that the shocks from either the financial or the commodity markets can spill over the 
other market, is in agreement with the observation of Cheng et al. (2015). 
 
13 Our basic result remains intact if one set of economic agents have privileged access to information.  This is 
because informational advantage aggravates the market power of the privileged set vis-à-vis the remaining 
sets of agents. 
 
14 This result is true even in the presence of institutional investors who own mixed (financial plus commodity) 
asset portfolio. 
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We caution empirical investigators on drawing inferences from the time series data, 
which reflect movements between multiple equilibria, and hence pose significant challenges 
and give rise to conflicting results.  This is because each equilibrium implies satisfaction of 
distinct moment conditions.  This is hard to evaluate under a dynamic setting as the 
underlying strict assumption of the rigidity of constraints on economic agents breaks down.  
This rationale explains the futures pricing puzzle.  One possible way to overcome the issue of 
changes in the constraints and consequently in the moment conditions is to use high frequency 
(i.e., tick-by-tick) price data and assume that the constraints are stable over a small interval of 
time, such as a day.  High frequency data will provide enough observations within a day to 
estimate the parameters of interest so long as the constraints yielding the moment conditions 
are stable. 
 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition: 
Our model solutions are described as follows.  The first equilibrium constitutes as the 
unconstrained highest ranking one.  The second group of equilibria constitutes of mid-ranked 
ones, which are subject to a single binding constraint.  Finally, the third group of equilibria 
constitutes of the lowest ranked ones, which are subject to two binding constraints. 
 
The Economically Highest Ranked Equilibrium (PCS
t+1
 – Solution 1, see Table) 
This signifies an interior equilibrium, where the hedging or risk management constraints 
on agents are not binding (i.e. µ
t+1
 = Φ'
t+1
 = Φ''
t+1
 = 0).  In other words, the futures contracting 
of all agents are in the satiation region.  This equilibrium is evaluated by superimposing the 
demand-supply financial sector (i.e., futures) constraint (equation 14) on the respective pricing 
functions of various agents derived in Sections 3.2-3.4.  Since this equilibrium involves four 
endogenous variables (f
t+1
, q
Pt+1
, qCt+1
, q
St+1
), four independent equations (7), (10), (12) and 
(14) are sufficient to yield a unique normal backwardation solution.  In this case: 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
) = 
Cov
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
))
  
Cov
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
,c
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
 = 
Cov
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
))
 <  0 (16) 
Here the marginal utility of each agent adjusts in such a way that no agent can extract 
any economic surplus from the other.  Deviation of futures price from expected spot price is 
given in terms of a covariance term (of marginal utility of stochastic consumption with price 
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risk) divided by the expectation of marginal utility of consumption.  The stochastic 
consumption parameter of all agents is impacted jointly by the operational (i.e., yield) and 
price risks, as illustrated in equations (5), (8) and (11).  We note that the above pricing 
function (along with the others given below such as equations (17–22), and (23–31)) reflect 
the risk profile of the agents in the economy.  This is different from that derived from the 
″cash–and–carry″ arbitrage, which is free of risk aversion parameters. 
 
The Economically Mid-Ranked Equilibria 
In general, non-satiation of futures contracting of either agent in the economy leads to a 
strictly binding hedging or risk management constraint.  The binding constraint endows the 
respective agent with market power.  Since constraints lead to a reduction in welfare, the agent 
subject to it gains market power.  S/he can take the price of futures determined by the 
competing agents at a favorable level. 
To elaborate this point further: 
 
(i) Equilibrium PC
t+1
 (Solution 5): 
If the risk management constraint on the Speculator is binding (Φ''
t+1 > 0; qSt+1
= 
q¯
t+1
), then the futures pricing is determined by both Producers and Consumers, 
while the economic surplus is retained by the Speculator.  That is, 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  = 
Cov
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
))
  
Cov
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
,c
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
  <  0, and 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  <   
Cov
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
))
   (17) 
 
Equilibrium PS
t+1
 (Solution 9): 
Here, the Consumer’s hedging constraint binds (Φ'
t+1 > 0; qCt+1 
= Min.(c
~
t+1
)).  
Futures pricing is thus determined by both Producers and Speculators, while the 
economic surplus is retained by the Consumer.  That is, 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
))
    
Cov
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
))
  <  0, and 
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f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
) <   
Cov
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
,c
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
   (18) 
 
Equilibrium CS
t+1
 (Solution 13): 
Here, the Producer’s hedging constraint binds (µ
t+1
> 0; qPt+1
= Min.(y*
~
t+1
)).  
Futures pricing is determined by both Consumers and Speculators, while the 
economic surplus is retained by the Producer.  That is, 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
) =  
Cov
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
,c
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
   
Cov
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
))
  >/< 0, and 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  >   
Cov
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
))
 (19) 
 
(ii) The equilibria given below are an improvement over the results of ap Gwilym 
and Ebrahim (2013). 
Equilibrium P'C'
t+1
 (Solution 2): 
Here the futures pricing is determined jointly by the Producers and Consumers, 
while the Speculator is priced out of the market (qSt+1 
= 0).  That is, 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
))
    
Cov
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
,c
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
 <  0 (20) 
 
Equilibrium P'S'
t+1
 (Solution 3): 
Here, the futures pricing is determined jointly by the Producers and Speculators, 
while the Consumer is priced out of the market (qCt+1 
= 0).  That is, 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
) =  
Cov
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
))
    
Cov
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
))
  <  0 (21) 
Equilibrium C'S'
t+1
 (Solution 4): 
Here, the futures pricing is determined jointly by the Consumers and Speculators, 
while the Producer is priced out of the market (qPt+1 
= 0).  That is, 
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f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
) =   
Cov
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
,c
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
    
Cov
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
))
  >/<  0 (22) 
 
The Economically Lowest Ranked Equilibria 
If two of the three constraints on the agents are binding, then the futures price is 
determined by the remaining agents’ reservation price.  Here the market power is extricated by 
the agents facing the constraint, as their futures pricing conditions hold as strict inequalities. 
 
(i) Equilibrium P
t+1
 (Solution 17): 
Here, the futures pricing is determined solely by the Producers, while the 
Consumers and Speculators are price-takers.  That is, 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
))
  <  0, 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  <  
Cov
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
,c
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
 , and 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  <  
Cov
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
))
  (23) 
 
Equilibrium C
t+1
 (Solution 21): 
Here, the futures pricing is determined solely by the Consumers, while the 
Producers and Speculators are price-takers.  That is, 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =   
Cov
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
,c
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
  >/<  0, 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  >   
Cov
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
))
 , and 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  <   
Cov
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
))
 . (24) 
 
Equilibrium S
t+1
 (Solution 25): 
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Here, the futures pricing is determined solely by the Speculators, while the 
Producers and Consumers are price-takers.  That is, 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
))
  >/<  0, 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  >   
Cov
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
))
 , and 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  <   
Cov
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
,c
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
  (25) 
 
(ii) The equilibria given below are an improvement over the results of ap Gwilym 
and Ebrahim (2013). 
Equilibrium (P')1(t+1)
 (Solution 7): 
Here, the futures pricing is determined solely by the Producers, while: (i) the 
Speculators are price-takers; and (ii) the Consumers are priced out of the market 
(qCt+1 
= 0).  That is, 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
) = 
Cov
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
))
  <  0, and 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  <   
Cov
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
))
 . (26) 
 
Equilibrium (C')1(t+1)
 (Solution 8) 
Here, the futures pricing is determined solely by the Consumers, while: (i) the 
Speculators are price-takers; and (ii) the Producers are priced out of the market 
(q
Pt+1
 = 0).  That is, 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
,c
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
  >/<  0, and 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  >   
Cov
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
))
  (27) 
 
Equilibrium (S')1(t+1)
 (Solution 12) 
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Here, the futures pricing is determined solely by the Speculators, while: (i) the 
Consumers are price-takers; and (ii) the Producers are priced out of the market 
(q
Pt+1
 = 0).  That is, 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
))
  >/<  0, and 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  <   
Cov
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
,c
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
 . (28) 
 
(iii) Equilibrium (P')2(t+1)
 (Solution 10): 
Here, the futures pricing is determined solely by the Producers, while: (i) the 
Consumers are price-takers; and (ii) the Speculators are priced out of the market 
(q
St+1
 = 0).  That is, 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
))
  <  0, and 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  <   
Cov
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
,c
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
  (29) 
 
Equilibrium (C')2(t+1)
 (Solution 14) 
Here, the futures pricing is determined solely by the Consumers, while: (i) the 
Producers are price-takers; and (ii) the Speculators are priced out of the market 
(q
St+1
 = 0).  That is, 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
,c
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(U'C
C(cC
~
t+1
, c
~
t+1
))
  >/<  0, and 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  >  
Cov
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
))
  (30)
  
Equilibrium (S')2(t+1)
 (Solution 15) 
Here, the futures pricing is determined solely by the Speculators, while: (i) the 
Producers are price-takers; and (ii) the Consumers are priced out of the market 
(q
Ct+1
 = 0).  That is, 
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f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  =  
Cov
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(US'(cS
~
t+1
))
 >/<  0, 
 
f
t+1
  E
t
(p
~
t+1
)  >   
Cov
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
), p
~
t+1
)
E
t
(UP'(cP
~
t+1
))
 . (31) 
 
Thus, the presence of the three tier equilibria in a dynamic setting can lead to the market 
moving between multiple equilibria, alternating between normal backwardation and contango, 
thereby increasing volatility and making the empirical analysis of time series data unintelligible, 
leading to a puzzling behavior of futures prices. 
 Q.E.D. 
Table 1 [Interior Solution for the case of perishable commodity] 
Solution 
No. 
Producer’s 
Hedging 
Constraint 
(µ
t+1
) 
Consumer’s 
Hedging 
Constraint 
(Φ'
t+1
) 
Speculator’s 
Risk Mgt. 
Constraint 
(Φ''
t+1
) 
Producer’s 
K-T 
Condition 
(q
Pt+1
) 
Consumer’s 
K-T 
Condition 
(q
Ct+1
) 
Speculator’s 
K-T 
Condition 
(qSt+1
) 
Equilibrium Nomenclature 
 
(Yellow highlight indicates double equilibria) 
1 0 0 0 > 0 > 0 > /< 0 PCSt+1 with Prod., Con. and Spec. setting price of futures 
2 0 0 0 > 0 > 0 0 
P'C'
t+1
 with Prod. and Con. setting price and Spec. not participating (q
St+1
 = 0) 
3 0 0 0 > 0 0 > /< 0 
P'S'
t+1
 with Prod. and Spec. setting price and Con. not participating (q
Ct+1
 = 0) 
4 0 0 0 0 > 0 > /< 0 
C'S'
t+1
 with Con. and Spec. setting price and Prod. not participating (q
Pt+1
 = 0) 
5 0 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > /< 0 PCt+1 with Prod. and Con. setting price, while spec. is a price taker (extricating 
economic surplus) 
6 0 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 0 This equilibrium does not make sense as constraint and K-T condition contradict each 
other. 
7 0 0 > 0 > 0 0 > / < 0 
P'
1(t+1)
 with Prod. setting price, Spec. being a price-taker and Con. not participating 
(q
Ct+1
 = 0) 
8 0 0 > 0 0 > 0 > / < 0 
C'
1(t+1)
 with Con. setting price, Spec. being a price-taker and Prod. not participating 
(q
Pt+1
 = 0) 
9 0 > 0 0 > 0 > 0 > / < 0 PSt+1 with Prod. and Spec. setting price, while consumer is price-taker (extricating 
economic surplus) 
10 0 > 0 0 > 0 > 0 0 
P'
2(t+1)
 with Prod. setting price, Con. being a price-taker, and Spec. not participating 
(q
St+1
 = 0) 
11 0 > 0 0 > 0 0 > / < 0 This equil. does not make sense as constraint and K-T condition contradict each other. 
12 0 > 0 0 0 > 0 > / < 0 
S'
1(t+1)
 with Spec. setting price, Con. being a price taker, and Prod. not participating 
(q
Pt+1
 = 0) 
13 > 0 0 0 > 0 > 0 > / < 0 CSt+1 with Con. and Spec. setting price, while Prod. is a price taker (extricating 
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 economic surplus) 
14 > 0 0 0 > 0 > 0 0 
C'
2(t+1)
 with Con. setting price, Prod. being a price-taker and Spec. not participating 
(q
St+1
 = 0) 
15 > 0 0 0 > 0 0 > / < 0 
S'
2(t+1)
 with Spec. setting price, Prod. being a price-taker and Con. not participating 
(q
Ct+1
 = 0) 
16 > 0 0 0 0 > 0 > / < 0 This equil. does not make sense as constraint and K-T condition contradict each other. 
17 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > / < 0 Pt+1 with Prod. setting price, while both Con. and Spec. are price-takers. 
18 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 0 This equil. does not make sense as constraint and K-T condition contradict each other. 
19 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 0 > / < This equil. does not make sense as constraint and K-T condition contradict each other. 
20 0 > 0 > 0 0 > 0 > / < 0 This equil also does not make sense as Prod. is supposed to set prices while the other 
two agents are price-takers.  However, q
Pt+1
 = 0. 
21 > 0 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > / < 0 Ct+1 with Con. setting price, while Prod. and Spec. are price-takers (extricating 
economic surplus). 
22 > 0 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 0 This equil. does not make sense as constraint and K-T condition contradict each other. 
23 > 0 0 > 0 > 0 0 > / < 0 This equil also does not make sense as Con. is supposed to set prices while the other two 
agents are price-takers.  However, q
Ct+1
 = 0. 
24 > 0 0 > 0 0 > 0 > / < 0 This equil. does not make sense as constraint and K-T condition contradict each other. 
25 > 0 > 0 0 > 0 > 0 > / < 0 St+1 with Spec. setting price, while Con. and Prod. are price-takers. 
26 > 0 > 0 0 > 0 > 0 0 This equil also does not make sense as Spec. is supposed to set prices while the other 
two agents are price-takers.  However, q
St+1
 = 0. 
27 > 0 > 0 0 > 0 0 > / < 0 This equil. does not make sense as constraint and K-T condition contradict each other. 
28 > 0 > 0 0 0 > 0 > / < 0 This equil. does not make sense as constraint and K-T condition contradict each other. 
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